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PROTECTING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY WITH AMERICAN 
TRADEMARK LAW 
 
Steven John Olsen* 
 
 “Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition in business must be determined with 
particular reference to the character and circumstances of the business.”1   
Introduction 
In the early fifth century BC, a group of theologians began discussing the purpose of the 
universe.
2
  They discussed the creation of the world, the purpose of the corporeal life, and the 
existence of an afterlife.  These discussions quickly led to a set of beliefs focused on an 
identified creator of all things.  News of these discussions spread throughout the country and the 
populace began to agree with the theologians’ beliefs.  Devotional and ritual observances began 
to spread among the followers.  The people of the country declared these beliefs as a religion 
known as Servyism.   
As Servyism became more popular it began to spread beyond the country’s borders.  The 
theologians founded a religious organization to provide guidance in the ways of Servyism:  
Servyism Mother Church.  The organization, as the term mother church in contemporary usage 
describes, was used to create the tenets of Servyism, develop religious practices, and develop 
spiritual leaders for the ministry.  Throughout the remaining portion of the fifth century BC, 
groups led by the Servyism Mother Church’s spiritual leaders devoted their lives to the Servyism 
faith.  The followers began to view the term “Servyism” as a source identifier of the religious 
organization in addition to the religion itself. 
 During the turn of the fourth century BC, two groups of Servyism followers began taking 
issue with some of the ideological beliefs proclaimed by the Servyism Mother Church.  These 
groups each broke away from the founding organization and began their own organizations:  
Holy Obeyist Church of Servyism and Exalted Church of Servyism.  They professed very similar 
ideological beliefs to the Servyism Mother Church with only a few distinct differences.  The 
Exalted Church of Servyism proclaimed that its followers would receive greater honor in the 
afterlife compared to followers of other Servyism branches.  The Holy Obeyist Church of 
Servyism disagreed with the Servyism Mother Church’s use of parishioner donations.  All three 
religious organizations continued to grow throughout the country.  They all believed in spreading 
the faith among the entire populace.  As the faith spread, the public began to identify the names 
of the three religious organizations as representing distinct branches (organizations) of the 
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1
 Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). 
2
 The facts developed by the author in this introductory hypothetical are fictional and do not represent the history or 
background of any specific religion. 
 
  
Servyism religion.  The organizations and the public began to use the terms “Originalist,” 
“Obeyist,” and “Exaltist” to identify each respective organization.  
 As the third century BC approached, limbs of each branch began to grow.  These limbs 
embraced the general ideological beliefs of each of the branches, but maintained a set of 
individual beliefs separate from those of the founding organizations.  The branches accepted the 
limbs as authorized extensions of the religious organizations.  A few of the sprouting limbs 
included the “Kracorian Originalist,” the “Winter Obeyist,” and the “Mungult Exaltist.”  The 
public began viewing the terms as identifiers for the specific religious organizational limbs 
associated with their respective organizational branches within the Servyism faith. 
 By the second century BC, followers of the limbs began requesting permission to use the 
terms associated with the branches and limbs in their local churches.  Some of these requests 
were granted and others were denied.  Of those granted, some added regional or local terms to 
the name, such as “Southern Kracorian Originalist” and “Oakland Winter Obeyist”; while others 
added general religious terms to the name, such as ”Mungult Exaltist of Prayer.”  Some of those 
who were denied permission to associate chose to ignore the denial and use the branch and limb 
names in their church: “Sacrificial Winter Obeyist,” who wanted to add human sacrifices; 
“Reformed Mungult Exaltist,” who wanted to preach a one race philosophy; and “Kracorian 
Originalist of Chicago,” who approved some criminal activities.  Simultaneously, a group of 
non-believers formed the “Genuine Servyism Church,” whose purpose was to profess beliefs 
contrary to those of the Servyism faith. 
Strife was building among and between the religious entities.  The Servyism Mother 
Church wanted to prevent the development of additional branches of Servyism by preventing the 
Holy Obeyist Church of Servyism and Exalted Church of Servyism from using the term 
Servyism in their organizational names.  After each was formed, they individually with their 
respective limbs wanted to prevent all denied parties from using their names in unaffiliated 
churches.  Finally, every other branch and limb wished to prevent the “Genuine Servyism 
Church” from using the term Servyism in its religious organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
I.  Understanding the Context of Religious Trademarks 
Before determining if any of the religious organizations described in the Servyism 
hypothetical can prevent another from using its terms, one must fully understand the context of 
religious trademarks.  This context will be viewed in three separate parts.  The first part discusses 
religion in the legal system and the structure of religious trademark infringement suits.  The 
second part identifies marks worthy of trademark protection.  It begins by discussing the scales 
of distinction generally; next, it analyzes tests for determining the genericness of a mark 
including an identification of the relevant public; finally, it discusses the distinctiveness of 
religious marks with a specific emphasis on denominations and religions.  The third part then 
assesses religious trademark deception and consumer confusion. 
A. Religion in the Legal System 
  Civil courts may resolve property disputes between religious organizations, but may not 
make rulings as to internal ecclesiastical matters.
3
  On internal religious issues, civil courts 
should accept the rulings made within the established religious organization’s decision-making 
body.
4
  “Thus no First Amendment issue arises when a court resolves a church property dispute 
by relying on state statutes concerning the holding of religious property, the language in the 
relevant deeds, and the terms of corporate charters of religious organizations.”5  Since civil 
courts are not allowed to make an ecclesiastical exception to neutrally applicable laws, religious 
organizations have been instructed by courts to include their requirements for treating religious 
property within “such instruments as ‘deeds or the corporate charter.’ ”6  These property 
protection techniques have been successfully used in the trademark context.
7
   
 
  In these cases, plaintiffs “are not seeking to interfere with Defendants’ worship services 
or religious beliefs or practices.”8  In trademark law, a religious organization is welcome to take 
the religious beliefs and practices (the good) and start a competing religious organization, but 
they are not allowed to take the good will or identity of another.  Under this theory, a competing 
organization may take the tenets, purpose, and beliefs of another, but cannot refer to their new 
organization with the competing trademark or source identifier.
9
  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has clearly stated: 
 
                                                 
3
  Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Ariz. 1985). 
4
 Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Civil 
courts . . . may defer[] to the decision-making authorities of hierarchical churches.”). 
5
 Id. at 1249. 
6
 Id. at 1250 (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)). 
7
 Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, Inc. v. Grady, 119 F.3d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1997).  The Sovereign 
Order of Saint John of Jerusalem prevented previously denied individuals from using the organization’s mark to 
overtake those members actually chosen to maintain control of the religious organization.  Id. 
8
 Cmty. of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Miller, No. 07-0543-CV-W-GAF, 2007 WL 4333192, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 
2007). 
9
 Nat’l Bd. of YWCA v. YWCA of Charleston, S.C., 335 F. Supp. 615, 624–25 (D.S.C. 1971), quoted in Gen. 
Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Perez, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (S.D. Fla. 2000). 
 
  
The right to use the name inheres in the institution, not in its members; and, when they 
cease to be members of the institution, use by them of the name is misleading and, if 
injurious to the institution, should be enjoined. No question of religious liberty is 
involved. Men have the right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience; but 
they have no right in doing so to make use of a name which will enable them to 
appropriate the good will which has been built up by an organization with which they are 
no longer connected.
10
  
Trademark disputes over the use of a religious name are most likely to occur in one of 
four different circumstances: (1) religious groups of similar ideological beliefs with some 
distinctive differences, (2) religious groups with conflicting ideological beliefs, (3) religious 
groups and those organizations that may disprove or disparage the religion, and (4) religious 
groups against secular organizations unrelated to the ideological beliefs.
11
  The first category is 
the most common and is most likely to confuse parishioners;
12
 however, each category threatens 
the identity of a religious mark and must be considered individually.  Nonetheless, these 
categories are only considered upon first concluding that the religious mark, representing the 
identity of the religious entity, is worthy of trademark protection. 
B. Identifying Marks Worthy of Trademark Protection 
  
Before determining the likelihood of consumer confusion in any given factual situation, a 
court must determine if the mark in question deserves trademark protection.  A religious 
organization must first use the mark as a source identifier before it can receive any protection.
13
  
This alone is not enough, a mark must also be considered distinctive before it can receive 
trademark protection.   
1. The Scales of Distinction 
  Once a court has determined that a mark has been used as a source identifier, it will then 
determine where the mark falls within the scales of distinction.  The scales of distinction are used 
to determine the strength of the mark and the level of protection the mark is guaranteed.
14
  If the 
mark is registered then it is presumed to be valid and deserving of trademark protection;
15
  
however, in an unregistered trademark infringement case, the case will be dismissed if the 
                                                 
10
 Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987 (4th Cir. 1944).   
11
 See David A. Simon, Register Trademarks and Keep the Faith: Trademarks, Religion and Identity 49 IDEA 233, 
264 (2009) (recognizing the former three categories). 
12
 When religious groups exist that retain similar ideological beliefs with some distinctive differences, trademark 
infringement litigation can arise in a variety of circumstances:  (1) a part of the religious followers break away from 
the religious organization, (2) a new and distinct religious organization is created by parties outside the original 
religious organization, (3) a religious assembly requests affiliation with the religious organization but is excluded, 
(4) a religious organization revokes the trademark rights of a current affiliate or (5) a unified mother organization is 
created from pre-existing religious organizations.  Id. at 268. 
13
 See Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1491–92 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing whether the St. 
George of Ladder Day Saints Temple is a “universally identified symbol of Mormonism”). 
14
 See infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text (outlining each of the levels for which a mark may qualify on the 
scales of distinction). 
15
 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012). 
 
  
plaintiff does not allege that their trademark is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary 
meaning.
16
   
 
The lowest level mark of distinction is classified as a generic mark, “a designation that is 
understood by prospective purchasers to denominate the general category, type, or call of the 
goods, services, or business,” which receives no protection under the United States system of 
trademark law.
17
  The second level includes descriptive marks, a mark that a prospective 
purchaser will likely perceive as a mere description “of the nature, qualities, or other 
characteristics of the goods, services, or business with which it is used,” which only receives 
trademark protection upon a valid showing of secondary meaning.
18
  The third level includes 
suggestive marks, which require consumer imagination to understand the connection between the 
mark and the product, service or business, but do not require secondary meaning in order to 
receive trademark protection.
19
  The final and most distinctive level includes arbitrary and 
fanciful marks, which can include common words applied to a product, service, or business 
unrelated to its meaning or completely new words with no present meaning.
20
  Of these 
distinctions religious marks are generally classified within the first three categories. 
 
  “Religious organizations frequently use terms of faith within their names, leaving them 
particularly susceptible to [distinction] problem[s].”21  The most difficult problem courts face in 
a religious trademark case is determining if a mark is generic.  “A review of the genericness 
cases involving religious institutions reveals mixed results.”22  Each of the following marks has 
been declared generic by one court and distinctive by another: (1) Christian Science, (2) Baha’i, 
and (3) Self-Realization.
23
  These discrepancies cause particular concern because a single court 
can declare that a mark is or has become generic, call for the cancellation of the mark, and 
recognize the unenforceable nature of the generic mark.
24
  Therefore, prior to challenging 
another’s unauthorized use of a religious entity’s source identifier, a plaintiff must be prepared to 
argue that the mark is not generic under any current test.  
                                                 
16
 See Douglas v. Osteen, 317 Fed.App’x 97, 99–100 (3d Cir.  2009) (dismissing the plaintiff’s case for failing to 
allege that his trademarked phrase “eyes of faith” was distinctive). 
17
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15(1) (2008).   
18
 Id. § 14.  See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing secondary meaning). 
19
 See Am. Television & Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Commc’ns & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 
1987). 
20
 See Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2004) (classifying the term “survivor” as arbitrary when 
applied to a band because the term is applied to a service unrelated to its meaning); Field Enters. Educ. Corp. v. 
Cove Indus., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 989, 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (explaining how fanciful and coined words are strong 
marks protected against all users, but that “World Book” is neither fanciful nor coined because it described the work 
itself as a book including the relevant knowledge of the world).  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 13 cmt. (c) (2008) (articulating the reasons why fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are 
declared inherently distinctive).   
21
 Simon, supra note 11, at 247. 
22
 Stocker v. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1996 WL 427638, at *8 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 1994) (citations omitted). 
23
 Id. (citations omitted). 
24
 TE-TA-MA Truth Found.–Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2002).  
A court is given two options upon determining that plaintiff’s registered mark is generic in the context for which it is 
used: (1) a court may order the agency to cancel the mark or (2) the court may cancel the mark determining the right 
to registration itself.  15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006), cited in TE-TA-MA Truth, 297 F.3d at 665. 
 
  
 
2. Current Tests for Determining if a Mark is Generic 
  There are various tests used when determining if a mark is or has become generic.  
Courts regularly analyze whether the term is a noun or adjective, whether additional terms exist 
to describe the good, and whether the name is commonly used to describe the good itself or a 
class of goods.  Under the first test, a trademark must be an adjective or adverb and cannot be 
considered a noun.  When used, a mark should be capitalized or otherwise set apart from the 
generic term or noun used to describe the particular good or service.
25
  This distinction, however, 
is not as relevant in the religious context because “religions and their adjectival forms are always 
capitalized” in the English language.26  Identifying the noun within the religious context is very 
challenging.  Accordingly, a plaintiff may argue that this test should not be applied to religious 
marks. 
 
  The second test requires the court to determine if other terms exist which can be used to 
describe the good.  This test supports government policy against granting monopolistic use of the 
only word or phrase capable of describing a specific product or service.  If additional terms are 
available, then the trademark will not likely be classified as generic.
27
  This analysis was 
performed in Jews for Jesus, where the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey suggested several ways to describe “individuals of Jewish heritage who believe in 
Jesus.”28  In explaining the relevance of alternatives to the court’s determination of 
distinctiveness, the court notes that a generic mark has so few alternatives as to create a 
monopoly while “a descriptive mark ‘leaves a larger but finite set of equivalent 
alternatives . . . .’ ”29  Consequently, a plaintiff must be prepared to show alternative ways to 
describe the good it offers. 
 
  The third test provides that a mark is or has become generic when it is the name of the 
product itself or the name of a class of products.
30
  This test is easily applied to the general 
marketplace of goods and services.  For instance, a company could not trademark the word book, 
computer, chair, massage, taxi, or therapy as each of these are the common name for the product 
or service itself.  Additionally, a term does not escape a generic classification because it 
represents a class of products or services such as jewelry or doctor.  In the religious context, one 
could not trademark the word “church” by itself as it represents the name for a class of 
services.
31
  Nonetheless, the existence of a term in the religious context that is itself a clear 
identification of a class of services is a rarity.  Thus, a plaintiff may argue that this test is too 
simplistic for religious marks.   
 
                                                 
25
 Stocker, 1996 WL 427638, at *28 (Hohein, J., dissenting). 
26
 Id. 
27
TE-TA-MA Truth, 297 F.3d at 667 (“[T]here is no risk that exclusive use of ‘Church of the Creator’ will 
appropriate a theology or exclude essential means of differentiating one set of beliefs from another.”).   
28
 Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D.N.J. 1998).   
29
 Id. (quoting Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1442 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
30
 See TE-TA-MA Truth, 297 F.3d at 666.   
31
 See id. 
 
  
The final test, which is performed by many courts, is the written appearance test.  This 
test analyzes how the word appears within various documents:  dictionary, encyclopedia, 
newspaper, or magazine.  Courts recognize that it is unlikely that a trademark has become 
synonymous with the product and not the producer, if it is not included in any dictionary.
32
  
However, this alone cannot be the test for genericness as courts are unwilling to bestow such 
power upon lexicographers.
33
 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted that using 
individual definitions of each word within a composite mark carries little weight because 
“dictionaries reveal a range of historical meanings rather than [defining] how people use a 
particular phrase in contemporary culture.”34  The court noted that “lexicographers’ definitions” 
of the individual words in the mark “Church of the Creator,” like the phrase “cut the mustard,” 
do not properly reveal the contemporary meaning of the term or phrase.
35
  Additionally, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that it is improper for a 
court to use a ruling on the validity or distinctiveness of component parts to determine the 
validity or distinctiveness of a composite term.
36
  This ruling was used to overturn the lower 
courts holding that the mark “Self-Realization Fellowship Church” was generic because the 
terms “self-realization,” “fellowship,” and “church” when used alone were generic.37  However, 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rightfully continues to use dictionary definitions of each 
word as evidence of the composite words meaning within the context of the relevant public’s 
contemporary usage.
38
  The Board also regularly refers to how the organization itself uses the 
phrase as well as what third parties (i.e., printed publications or competitors) are referencing 
when using the phrase.
39
  As a result, plaintiffs should be prepared to explain all written 
appearances of their religious marks. 
 
Ultimately, these tests are used by the courts to determine the relevant public’s perception 
of the mark.  It has been suggested that the noun/adjective test, alternative names test, and 
written appearance test are inappropriate when used individually because they are mechanistic 
tests which do not properly account for the factual circumstances of each case.
40
  Similarly, these 
tests are not determinative individually, but should be used as “ ‘springboards for analysis’ ” in 
identifying the relevant public’s perception of a mark.41   
 
                                                 
32
 E.g., Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (D. Ariz. 1995). 
33
 See In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 772, 778 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 1981), quoted in Stocker v. Gen. Conference 
Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1996 WL 427638, at *15 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 1994). 
34
 TE-TA-MA Truth, 297 F.3d at 666. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 1995). 
37
 Id. 
38
 See, e.g., In re Missions Fest Int’l Assoc., No. 78631248, 2007 WL 2422989, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2007) 
(non-precedential). 
39
 Stocker v. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1996 WL 427638, at *16 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 1994). 
40
 Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs. of First Church of Christ, Scientists v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1359 (N.J. 1987) 
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). 
41
 Id. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (quoting Walt-West Enters. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 
  
3. Who is the Relevant Public? 
 When determining if a mark identifies the good itself, a court must consider the entire 
collection of potential clients: “the avid, the novice, and the not yet acquainted.”42  Courts 
discount a defendant’s argument that the religious audience targeted includes fewer members 
than that of the original mark holder; however, it would be inaccurate to suggest that this group 
includes the entire purchasing public.
43
  The “potential clients” are limited to those who are 
likely to have an interest in the product or service being offered.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit described this as limiting the relevant public to “actual or 
potential” clients of the specific services offered.44   The Ninth Circuit recognized that “one term 
may have different meanings to different groups of listeners” and that “the way to determine 
whether a term is generic is to determine whether consumers of [those] products and services 
think it is generic.”45  Accordingly, the relevant purchasing public or potential clients are 
determined on a case-by-case basis.
46
  Once the relevant public is identified, a court can 
determine the contemporary meaning of a religious mark in the minds of that public. 
4. Are Denominational Names Generic? 
 As previously noted, generic terms can be combined with other generic or more 
distinctive terms and the resulting composite term may be viewed in the eyes of the relevant 
public as distinctive and deserving of trademark protection.
47
  This was the situation in Te–Ta–
Ma, where the court recognized that “church” alone is generic, but “Church of the Creator” is 
descriptive.
48
  The court reasoned that “Church of the Creator” does not denote the class of 
monotheistic religions or designate a specific religion for which a denomination belongs, but 
instead acts as a source identifier to differentiate an individual denomination.
49
  Additionally, 
claims suggesting that the “Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints” or the 
“RLDS Church” trademarks are generic have been found to be without merit because the 
trademarks represent a denomination of Christianity.
50
  They are not RLDS, but men and 
women, and as such are called RLDS only because of membership and association with the 
                                                 
42
 Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (D. Ariz. 1995).   
43
 See Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 305 (D.N.J. 1998) (classifying the defendants argument that they 
only intended their audience to include Jewish apostates and not gentiles as “curious, at best”).   
44
 Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
45
 Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1995). 
46
 In determining whether the mark “self-realization” was the generic term for Hindu-Yoga spiritual organizations, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that using persons with close association or intimate contact (i.e., employees or 
distributors) as corroborating evidence is an inaccurate reflection of the relevant purchasing public.  Id. at 910.  The 
relevant public identified in one of the Seventh-Day Adventists cases was “Christians and, more specifically, 
Adventist Christians.” Stocker, 1996 WL 427638, at *11.   This assessment, however, was highly criticized by the 
dissenting judge who suggested that the relevant public should be viewed as the general public because as a 
Protestant denomination, Seventh-Day Adventism is a proselytizing religion.  Id. at *24 (Hohein, J., dissenting). 
47
 See In re Missions Fest Int’l Assoc., No. 78631248, 2007 WL 2422989, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2007) (non-
precedential) (recognizing that two descriptive marks combined may create a separate nondescriptive meaning). 
48
 TE-TA-MA Truth Found.–Family of URI, Inc. v. World Church of the Creator, 297 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2002). 
49
  Id. 
 
50
  Cmty. of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Miller, No. 07-0543-CV-W-GAF, 2007 WL 4333192, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 
7, 2007). 
 
  
organization which has adopted that name.
51
  Nevertheless, some registrations within the United 
States Patent & Trademark Office currently include disclaimers for denominations while others 
do not.
52
   
 
In a seminal case on religious trademarks, the Fourth Circuit suggested, in dicta, that a 
third party may have the right to use denominational names like “Methodist” or “Episcopal” in 
its name so long as its name was constructed as to avoid confusion with other mark holders.
53
  In 
contrast, three years later the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that the denominational 
name “Church of God” could not be used by a defendant unaffiliated with the general 
assembly.
54
  The court held that “defendants may not lawfully use the name ‘The Church of 
God,’ or any similar name, to designate any other denominational organization than that of the 
General Assembly.”55  These discrepancies may be explained by the courts’ various 
interpretations of what a denomination represents in comparison to a religion.  For instance, a 
dissenting judge has argued that “each religious denomination, while often sharing some of the 
basic beliefs as other groups, fundamentally has its own irreducible set of principles, tenets or 
precepts which collectively make the religion it offers one of a kind.”56  By classifying 
denominations as new and different religions, the judge suggested that denomination names 
should not receive trademark protection as they are generic words for their specific religion.
57
   
 
This same argument has been made after the creation of a new religion, such as Christian 
Science.  As new religions do not have denominations upon their creation, courts have suggested 
that the name adopted to refer to the religion cannot also be used as a trademark to refer to either 
the governing organization or a specific church.
58
  Most courts have held that the name of a 
religion is available for all followers to use and that no one can hold a monopoly upon the name 
of a religion.
59
  Nonetheless, the United States District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina held the mark “Christian Science” as distinctive and worthy of protection after quoting, 
“Christian Science is a religion . . . .”60  Given these discrepancies, it is important for courts to 
                                                 
51
 See Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 987 (4th Cir. 1944); Grand Lodge Improved, B.P.O.E. of the World v. 
Eureka Lodge No. 5, Indep. Elks, 114 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1940) (noting that men are only “Elks” when associated 
with the organization). 
52
 Stocker v. Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1996 WL 427638, at *16 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 1994) (noting that “Presbyterian” is disclaimed in Reg. Nos. 1,012,486 and 1, 431,066 while 
“Lutheran” is not disclaimed in Reg. No. 1,085,986). 
53
  Purcell, 145 F.2d at 988. 
54
 Church of God v. Church of God, 50 A.2d 357, 361 (Pa. 1947).   
55
 Id. 
56
 Stocker, 1996 WL 427638, at *31 (Hohein, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
57
 Id. 
58
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remember that in the context of churches and religious organizations only material including the 
term used for the religion is considered orthodox within that religion.
61
  Given this fact, some 
courts have suggested that a mark may be generic when used to refer to a religion, but distinctive 
when used as a church name.
62
  Anyone can use the term to refer to his or her religion, but not 
everyone should be allowed to name his or her church or organization with the term.
63
  
Therefore, a court may decide that although the plaintiff’s mark is distinctive, the defendant uses 
the plaintiff’s mark in its generic form and therefore does not infringe the mark.64 
5. If Not Generic, are Religious Marks Descriptive or Suggestive? 
The line between descriptive and suggestive is just as blurry as the line between generic 
and descriptive.  For instance, in the religious context, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida noted that the mark “Seventh Day Adventists” was suggestive even 
though the phrase describes elements of the faith.
65
  The court reasoned that the mark only 
described two parts of the faith and did not properly describe the other beliefs which distinguish 
it from organizations of a similar faith.
66
  The court used this reasoning to find the mark “clearly 
suggestive.”67  Conversely, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has noted that a mark does 
not have to describe all attributes associated with it to be classified as descriptive.
68
  Instead, the 
mark need only describe a significant attribute of the product or service before it is declared 
descriptive.
69
  For example, an examining attorney determined that the term “Kabbalah Red 
String” for religious articles by a “mystical segment of Jewish belief, Kabbalah,” was merely 
descriptive because “the term as a whole would merely describe a [single] feature of the religious 
articles—items consisting or containing red string, used in the practice of Kabbalah or in support 
of Kabbalistic beliefs.”70 
 
A mark classified as suggestive or better is inherently distinctive; however, if a mark is 
determined to be descriptive then a plaintiff must prove secondary meaning.  Circuit courts are 
split when determining which factors to consider in a secondary meaning case.
71
  In Jews for 
Jesus, the court determined that the trademark “Jews for Jesus” was descriptive and therefore 
required secondary meaning before trademark protection could be granted.
72
  Secondary meaning 
                                                                                                                                                             
publications pertaining to the religion or as a service mark for religious observances and 
missionary services based upon the religion. 
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suggests that the consuming public views the mark as identifying the producer, not the product.
73
  
The Jews for Jesus Court used four factors to determine what the phrase “Jews for Jesus” means 
in the minds of the relevant consumers: (1) money spent on advertising, (2) media coverage of 
the religious organization and its attributes, (3) effectiveness of marketing efforts, and (4) length 
and extent of the marks continual use.
74
  In addition to the factors analyzed in Jews for Jesus, 
courts regularly examine how many third parties are using similar marks and in what markets 
they are being applied.
75
  Finally, the extent of the public to actually view the mark as a source 
identifier for the producer is regularly considered the most important factor.
76
 
 
Nonetheless, being recognized as a source identifier alone is not enough.  For instance, in 
the religious context, if a mark is held by the relevant public to refer synonymously to the 
religion as well as the organization, a court may find that the mark has either only received de 
facto secondary meaning or is a dual-function mark.  De facto secondary meaning arises in cases 
where the general public begins to view a generic term, which existed before it was first used as 
a mark, as a source identifier for a specific organization.
77
  In this context, some scholars classify 
the mark as inherently generic rather than initially valid.
78
  Once a court determines that a mark 
only possesses de facto secondary meaning then it will acknowledge that this does not create or 
preserve trademark rights for the mark.
79
 
 
This analysis was performed by the New Jersey Supreme Court when they determined 
that the Christian Science religion was founded at least thirteen years before the Mother Church, 
the religion’s principal organization.80  Recognizing that “the religion pre-existed the 
organization” and that “the religion and the organization are conceptually separate” the court 
held the Christian Science mark to be generic as applied to all Christian Science churches.
81
  The 
court reasoned that this conclusion is true even when the Mother Church has been the exclusive 
supplier of the Christian Science religion.
82
  This reasoning is derived from our initial 
recognition that de facto secondary meaning does not grant exclusive rights upon the user.  
“Even though they succeed in the creation of de facto secondary meaning, due to a lack of 
competition or other happenstance, the law respecting registration will not give any effect.”83  
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Distinguishable from those marks only capable of receiving de facto secondary meaning 
are those marks capable of becoming dual-function marks—those that refer generically to the 
product or service and simultaneously act as a source identifier for the producer.
84
  These types 
of marks only exist when a mark was initially valid and not inherently generic.
85
  When handling 
a dual-mark, a court must determine the primary significance of the mark in the mind of the 
consumer.
86
  A court applies the same tests used when analyzing whether the mark was generic 
to determine a mark’s primary significance. 
 
Fundamentally, a plaintiff must first prove that its religious mark is worthy of trademark 
protection.  Religious marks that are inherently distinctive—arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive 
marks—automatically qualify.  On the other hand, descriptive marks and dual-function marks 
require secondary meaning or proof that the primary significance of the mark in the mind of the 
relevant consumers is to identify the producer or provider, not the product or service itself.  
Therefore, once the religious mark has been deemed worthy of trademark protection, a court will 
evaluate whether infringement has occurred.  Nonetheless, even when a mark is found unworthy 
of trademark protection—generic marks and marks with only de facto secondary meaning—a 
court may still preclude a defendant’s specific use of a term or mark because the term or mark is 
deceptive in nature. 
 
C. Religious Trademark Deception & Confusion 
 
Courts must determine whether a plaintiff should be successful in preventing the 
defendant from using specific terms in the defendant’s mark.  In making this decision a court 
will likely consider the relevant interests associated with the various parties affected by 
trademarks.  A court will also review the context of the industry in which the trademark is used.  
In reviewing this context, a court may evaluate whether the defendant’s specific use is deceptive 
in nature or whether it infringes another’s protectable trademark.  A court may then preclude all 
future use of deceptive or infringing marks. 
 
1. The Interests of Those Affected by Trademarks 
 
 A court reviewing trademark suits must evaluate the effect infringement or deception 
might have on all of the relevant parties.  Within the context of trademark law, the public interest 
refers to the public’s right not to be “confused or deceived.”87  Simultaneously, the public 
interest refers to the public’s right to rely on a valid mark as a source identifier for the attributes 
associated with a specific producer or provider.
88
  If someone transferred membership from an 
organization in one geographic location to a differently-located organization with a very similar 
name, he or she would expect the principles and policies of each to be the same because he or 
she would believe both entities were controlled by the same organization.
89
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In addition to protecting the public interest, trademark law is meant to protect the 
trademark owner from “unfair practices by an ‘imitating competitor.’ ”90  A religious 
organization has a substantial interest in protecting the good will and reputation associated with 
its ministry.  Religious organizations are constantly under scrutiny and deserve to be able to 
control what occurs under the guise of their marks.  Protecting the good will associated with a 
trademark is equally important to the consumer of the product or service — especially in the 
religious context.  Millions of members are “associated with the name the most sacred of their 
personal relationships and the holiest of their family traditions.”91 
 
2. Structure of the Religious Marketplace & Opportunity for Deception 
 
 Before analyzing the potential for consumer confusion, a court must recognize the 
structure of the religious marketplace.  Many religious organizations provide “a range of spiritual 
services, including: classes, lectures, and seminars on religion and self-help; ministerial services; 
religious consulting; ordination services; and religious, spiritual, and educational information via 
the [I]nternet.”92  The world is full of diverse religions and a variety of religious organizations 
associated with those religions.  Each religion has its own hierarchical structure.  For instance, “a 
Christian congregation would classify itself first into its denomination ([e.g.,] Baptist, Lutheran, 
Russian Orthodox, Society of Friends), then into one of the major groupings (Roman Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Protestant), and finally into Christianity . . . .”93 
 
Within these structures exists an array of different groups each with their own distinct 
ideological differences.  Each organization tries to maintain the good will connected with the 
attributes associated with its religious trademarks; however, tenets have been known to change 
with religious organizations.  As these tenets change, the attributes associated with the 
organization changes.  During this time, a portion of the followers are likely to separate, maintain 
the old ideological beliefs, and use a part of the original organizations mark to reference its 
newly founded religious organization.
94
 
 
In YWCA the defendant suggested that an organization deceives the public by maintaining 
a Christian religious connotation within its name after removing the Christian religious ideals 
from its organization.
95
  These allegations suggested that by deviating from the religious beliefs 
plaintiff was causing the use of the word “Christian” in its name to become a misrepresentation 
under trademark law—invalidating its rights.96  The United States District Court for the District 
of South Carolina held that inquiring into an organization’s religious beliefs and then ruling on 
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whether it is “Christian” is “prohibited by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”97  The court suggested that “[i]f plaintiff lost its valuable trademark rights because 
it did not conform to this Court’s interpretation of ‘Christianity,’ it would be a very serious 
encroachment upon religious freedom.”98  However this conclusion is one that should be 
scrutinized.   
 
The issue of deception can also be argued by a plaintiff.  Many marks in the religious 
context include the name of a religion.  Generally, a plaintiff represents the organization in 
charge of or affiliated with that religion.  If a defendant is practicing a religion other than that 
designated within its mark, a plaintiff will argue that inclusion of the religion within the 
defendant’s mark is a deception upon the public.  A court may prohibit a defendant from 
including the name of a religion in its mark, if the defendant is not practicing that particular 
religion.
99
 
3. Infringement in the Religious Context 
Although deception can be argued by both parties, the issue of consumer confusion must 
be proven by a plaintiff in an infringement suit.  “[I]f the overall impression created by [the] 
marks is essentially the same, ‘it is very probable that the marks are confusingly similar.’ ”100  In 
the context of religious marks, it is common that the alleged infringer will be a competitor 
offering the same or substantially similar products and services.  When a court is determining the 
likelihood of confusion between competitors, the court will likely focus its attention on the 
overall impression of the mark itself;
101
 however, the court will still put the mark through a set of 
confusion factors as identified by the specific circuit.
102
   
 
Understanding that the overall impression of the mark itself matters, some defendants 
believe that they have eliminated confusion by adding words in addition to the trademarked 
terms.  Under this guise, a church unaffiliated with the Seventh Day Adventists chose the name 
“Eternal Gospel Church of Seventh Day Adventists.”103  The initial qualifying phrase was found 
not to have reduced the danger of confusion in light of the overwhelming similarity of the 
marks.
104
  The term “committee” has also been held to be an insufficient qualifying term when 
the infringer’s mark is so similar as to include a substantial portion of the original mark.105  
Conversely, other courts who have found the same overwhelming similarity of the marks have 
reached alternative conclusions.  The Supreme Court of Oklahoma suggested that there is a key 
distinction between qualifying “Assembly of God” with the name of one’s town, which will 
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likely result in infringement, and qualifying it with terms such as “Holiness” or “Southern.”106  
The overwhelming similarity referenced in these cases is likely to be common among all cases 
within the religious trademark context.   
 
In addition to qualifying terms, some organizations have tried adding a parenthetical to 
their name.  Courts have found that infringement exists even when churches include the terms 
“independent” or “not merged” in a parenthetical after their names.107  Although these qualifying 
terms and phrases have been found to be insufficient, courts have not completely ruled out the 
use of qualifying phrases.  One dissenting judge has suggested that a church could use an 
unrelated name and include a dual-mark in a qualifying phrase to reference the religion.
108
  For 
example, the dissenting judge suggested using the following name for a church unaffiliated with 
the Christian Science Mother Church: “Plainfield Community Church—An Independent Church 
Practicing Christian Science.”109 
 
In the religious trademark context, four of the confusion factors generally favor the 
plaintiff.  Religious trademarks are usually applied to a finite number of goods, this means that 
the goods in question are of very close proximity.  This also removes the need to determine if the 
plaintiff is likely to expand into the specific product line.  Additionally, as noted earlier, 
trademark infringement suits rarely arise outside of situations where the marks in question are 
very similar if not even identical.  Finally, competing religious marks will likely be viewed by a 
similar audience because religious organizations generally use similar marketing channels.   
 
In addition to these factors, courts analyze a defendant’s intent in adopting the mark, 
sophistication of the consumer, evidence of actual confusion, and the strength of the mark.  A 
defendant’s intent can play a big role when a court analyzes the likelihood of confusion.  
Unclean hands exist when a plaintiff can prove that a defendant used a mark knowing and 
intending it to cause confusion and mislead the public as to the defendant’s affiliation with or 
sponsorship by the allegedly infringed trademark.
110
  In Jews for Jesus, the defendant admitted 
that the “intent behind [his] bogus ‘Jews for Jesus’ site (www.jewsforjesus.org) is to intercept 
potential converts before they have a chance to see the [content] on the real J4J site.”111  This 
admission proved that the defendant used the mark’s good will in order to siphon potential 
followers.  It is common for a court to determine that the alleged infringer was aware of the 
original mark and adopted it because of the attributes and good will associated with it.  This 
factor also weighs heavily in favor of the plaintiff.   
 
An inquiry into the level of consumer sophistication includes whether the consumers are 
sophisticated in the marketplace (i.e., Internet, door to door, store front) and the sophistication 
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level the consumer possesses with regard to information about religious organizations.
112
  “A 
large portion of any community is not well informed about ecclesiastical matters . . . .”113  
Additionally, the general nature of many parishioners is to trust and not second guess the 
authenticity of religious leaders and their organizations.  Given these facts, courts are likely to 
find that this factor also favors the plaintiff. 
 
Only two factors remain that could favor the defendant: evidence of actual confusion and 
strength of the mark.  While proof of actual confusion is not necessary in order for the plaintiff to 
prove trademark infringement, proof that consumers are not confused by the use of the mark 
eliminates the need to perform the multifactor test.
114
  Although this factor can be used to benefit 
the defendant, it is very difficult to prove.  A defendant’s strongest argument when suggesting 
that confusion does not exist lies within the strength of a plaintiff’s mark.  This is the reason 
most religious trademark cases center on an argument of genericness or descriptiveness without 
secondary meaning.  Therefore, if a plaintiff can prove that its mark is distinctive and worthy of 
trademark rights, then the court will likely find that a defendant has infringed those rights. 
 
II.  Evaluating the Servyism Hypothetical Within the Religious Trademark Context 
 
  The religious trademark context analyzed above is not just theoretical, but is intended as 
a framework to be factually applied to any given religious trademark scenario.  This section will 
apply the facts included in the introductory Servyism hypothetical to the religious trademark 
context.  This part will assume a federal court is examining each of the legal issues.  The federal 
court will begin by analyzing the distinctiveness of the plaintiffs’ marks.  It will then evaluate the 
consumer confusion and deception claims.  Finally, it will produce a ruling on all of the issues. 
 
A.  Distinctiveness of Marks 
 
  The distinctiveness of each mark must be evaluated separately.  There are several marks 
that have to be considered in the proposed hypothetical.  The written appearance test will be 
limited to current dictionary definitions of terms as the introductory facts did not include any 
details of public or private writings.
115
  Each of the other tests may be appropriately applied in 
their entirety to the facts of the introductory hypothetical.
116
  In applying these tests, the marks 
will be evaluated in the order of the respective entity’s appearance.  The Servyism Mother 
Church claims rights in three marks: Servyism, Servyism Mother Church, and Originalist.  This 
section will begin with Servyism. 
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  Servyism was not initially adopted by the religious organization.  Instead, the term was 
created by the public to identify the religion itself.  It was not until after the public began 
referring to the theologians set of religious beliefs as Servyism that the theologians formed the 
Servyism Mother Church and desired to protect the term Servyism.  Therefore, the term 
Servyism is inherently generic and identifies the religion itself.
117
  The fact that followers began 
to view the term Servyism as a source identifier for the religious organization is only proof of de 
facto secondary meaning.
118
  De facto secondary meaning cannot create rights in an inherently 
generic term.
119
  Therefore, Servyism is a term that has been acquired by the general public and 
cannot be owned by any one organization. 
 
   “Servyism Mother Church” is the second mark for which the religious organization 
claims trademark rights.  First, it should be noted that Servyism by itself has already been 
declared generic.  Additionally, the term Mother Church as admitted in the facts is 
contemporarily used to mean the original organization that developed the church’s tenets, 
practices, and spiritual leaders.  Since this is the only term that describes this specific type of 
organization, the term Mother Church alone would be declared generic.
120
  However, the 
combination of the generic term Servyism with the generic term Mother Church may be 
classified as distinctive, but each word individually must be disclaimed.
121
  Therefore, the term 
Servyism Mother Church should be declared descriptive and require secondary meaning.  
Although several factors are considered in determining the existence of secondary meaning, the 
facts noted that the general public recognized the mark as an identifier for that specific branch of 
the Servyism religion.
122
  Therefore, secondary meaning has been proven and the composite 
mark is worthy of trademark protection. 
 
  Finally, the Servyism Mother Church claims trademark rights for the “Originalist” mark.  
This mark has been used by the organization as a source identifier.
123
  It could be argued that the 
mark is descriptive because the term original is defined as “preceding all others.”124  
Additionally, the –ist suffix transforms the word to mean adherent to the doctrines that preceded 
all others.
125
  Given these facts, the Originalist mark should be declared descriptive.  
Nonetheless, secondary meaning has been proven by showing that the public identifies the 
Servyism Mother Church with the term Originalist.  Like all branches and limbs of Servyism, the 
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Servyism Mother Church and Originalist act as adjectives for which the Servyism religion is the 
noun.
126
   
 
  The next set of marks under analysis includes “Holy Obeyist Church of Servyism,” 
“Obeyist,” “Exalted Church of Servyism,” and “Exaltist.”  The mark “Holy Obeyist Church of 
Servyism” does not describe a feature specific to the religious organization.  In order to 
determine if the mark is descriptive or suggestive the court analyzes each word separately to 
determine the composite terms contemporary meaning.  “Holy” is defined as “associated with a 
divine power.”127  “Obeyist” can be seen as an adherent to the specific doctrine of obedience.128  
“Church” is defined as “a congregation.”129  Finally, “Servyism” has already been classified as 
the generic term for the religion.  Therefore, the composite term, without additional evidence, 
refers to a Servyism congregation associated with a divine power that adheres to the doctrine of 
obedience.  This does not describe a characteristic specific to this branch of Servyism, but 
instead describes a characteristic of all Servyism branches and most other religions.
130
  Given 
these meanings, both “Holy Obeyist Church of Servyism” and “Obeyist” should be declared 
suggestive marks.  However, if they were to be declared descriptive the general public views the 
marks as source identifiers for this distinct branch (organization) of the Servyism religion.  
Under either theory these marks should be classified as distinctive and worthy of protection. 
 
“Exalted Church of Servyism” must be evaluated in the same manner.  “Exalted” is 
defined as “raised in rank or status.”131  Therefore, the composite term means, without additional 
evidence, a Servyism congregation raised in rank or status.  This meaning describes a key feature 
specific to the branch of Servyism: receiving greater honor in the afterlife in comparison to 
followers of the other Servyism branches.  As such, this mark must be declared descriptive.
132
  
However, the general public has recognized that it views the mark as a source identifier for the 
distinct branch of the Servyism religion.  This proof of secondary meaning generates protectable 
trademark rights within the mark. 
 
On the other hand, the mark “Exaltist” does not describe a specific feature of the religious 
organization.  Exaltist would refer to a group that adheres to the doctrine of exalting.
133
  In this 
case, the contemporary public would likely apply the most common definition of “exalt” within 
the religious context, not exalted:  “to glorify, praise, or honor.”134  The public is then likely to 
view the term as an organization adhering to the doctrine of glorifying, praising, and honoring 
the creator of all things.  This is not a feature specific to this branch or religion.  Therefore, 
“Exaltist” should be declared suggestive and worthy of trademark protection. 
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  The final set of marks under analysis is the branches’ authorized limbs.  “Kracorian 
Originalist” and “Mungult Exaltist” are the easiest to determine distinctiveness.  The terms 
“Kracorian” and “Mungult” do not have either English or foreign meanings.135  Since these are 
new terms with no present meaning they are each declared fanciful marks worthy of 
protection.
136
  Conversely, “Winter Obeyist” cannot be declared fanciful because the term winter 
has a present meaning.  “Winter” is defined as “the coldest season of the year.”137  This meaning 
is completely unrelated to Winter Obeyist religious practices.  Therefore, the mark should be 
declared arbitrary and worthy of protection.
138
 
 
  The distinctiveness of the local groups affiliated with the limbs are not in question 
because only the plaintiff is required to show that its mark is distinctive and worthy of trademark 
protection.  Similarly, the distinctiveness of the marks used to describe the groups for whom 
affiliation was denied and the name of the non-believers group are also not in question.  
Nonetheless, these marks must still be evaluated for purposes of consumer confusion and 
deception. 
 
B. Consumer Confusion & Deception Claims 
 
  The claims of this case are separated into two categories:  consumer confusion and 
deception.  The category of consumer confusion includes the cases involving each branch, and its 
respective limb, against the local groups who chose to use the organizational marks after being 
denied affiliation with the organizations.  The deception category includes the original claim 
brought by the Servyism Mother Church against the two branches that broke away from the 
organization and the newest claim by all Servyism religious organizations against the group of 
non-believers who identify themselves as the Genuine Servyism Church. 
 
  Beginning with the consumer confusion claims, the court recognizes that the interests of 
the religious organizations, the parishioners of those organizations, and the general public are all 
at stake.
139
  In order to evaluate the overall impression of the marks, the court places them side 
by side:  Winter Obeyist v. Sacrificial Winter Obeyist; Mungult Exaltist v. Reformed Mungult 
Exaltist; and Kracorian Originalist v. Kracorian Originalist of Chicago.
140
  After viewing the 
similarities of the marks, the court acknowledges that simply adding an additional term will not 
prevent a finding of infringement.
141
  This is especially true under the facts of this case, where 
affiliated groups regularly add similar terms to designate their identity.  Next, the court begins 
evaluating the marks through the circuit’s likelihood of consumer confusion test. 
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  First, the court immediately notes that the alleged infringers use the full and complete 
mark of the plaintiffs.  Additionally, each defendant is in the same market and offers the same 
good as their respective plaintiff.  As noted earlier by the court, the good in this case is the 
religion of Servyism.  Given this fact, the court finds that expanding the product line or bridging 
the gap is an unnecessary factor in this case.  Since no evidence was shown to suggest what 
marketing channels either party used or whether actual confusion was or was not present, the 
court will find these factors neutral to both parties.   
 
However, the defendants’ intentions appear clear to the court as they were each denied 
affiliation with the respective branch, but still chose to use the marks.
142
  Since the defendants 
knew the marks were connected with the branches, this factor weighs in favor of the plaintiffs.  
When evaluating the sophistication of the consumers, this court agrees with the view that the 
general public is unsophisticated in ecclesiastical matters and tends to trust the authenticity of 
religious organizations.
143
  In light of these facts, this factor also weighs in favor of the plaintiffs.   
 
The final factor the court will consider is the strength of the plaintiffs’ marks in question.  
The three limb marks were declared the highest degree of distinction:  fanciful or arbitrary.  This 
high level of distinction is combined with proof that the public views the plaintiffs’ marks as 
identifiers for their specific religious organizational limbs.  Additionally, the three branch marks 
were found to be either suggestive or descriptive and possessed a strong degree of secondary 
meaning.  This factor, like every other non-neutral factor, weighs heavily in favor of the 
plaintiffs.  Each defendant is held liable for trademark infringement and shall be permanently 
enjoined from using any mark similar to those of the plaintiffs. 
 
After ruling on the consumer confusion cases the court begins to evaluate the claims of 
deception.  The original claim by Servyism Mother Church against Holy Obeyist Church of 
Servyism and Exalted Church of Servyism would have likely begun as a consumer confusion 
case.  However, once this court determined that the term “Servyism” was a generic term for the 
religion, the Servyism Mother Church would have likely alleged deception.  The theory of 
deception in this particular case is weak because the facts specified that the two new branches 
professed very similar ideological beliefs to that of the Servyism Mother Church.  Branches with 
a few distinct differences in religious beliefs are common and should be allowed within the 
marketplace of a particular religion.
144
  Given the structure of the marketplace and the generic 
nature of the religious name, no deception took place when the two new branches were formed 
and included the term Servyism in their names. 
 
The second and stronger claim of deception is against the Genuine Servyism Church.  In 
this case, the facts are significantly different than those in the previous deception case.  Here, we 
face a new religious organization that intends to profess beliefs contrary to those of the Servyism 
faith.  Additionally, the defendant includes the word “genuine” in its mark which is defined as 
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“actually possessing the alleged or apparent attribute or character.”145  Given the sophistication 
of the relevant public,
146
 as previously noted, this mark is highly likely to deceive the consuming 
public.  Although the term “Servyism” is not a protected mark, a religious organization 
practicing Servyism can prevent false practitioners from using the term in its name or claiming in 
any other way that their teachings are those of the Servyism faith.
147
  As such this court finds that 
the Genuine Servyism Church is deceiving the consuming public and is therefore enjoined from 
using the word Servyism or any word associated with that religion in its name. 
 
This court finds that all marks in question, except Servyism, are distinctive and worthy of 
trademark protection.  This court also finds that all claims of consumer confusion were viable 
and defendants are permanently enjoined from using any term similar to those of the branch and 
limb religious organizations.  This court finds the claim of deception against the two branches to 
be without merit; however, this court finds the claim of deception against the Genuine Servyism 
Church to be valid and permanently enjoins the defendant from claiming or suggesting any 
affiliation with the Servyism religion. 
 
III.  Recognizing the New Tests as Applied 
 
  Some of the conclusions drawn in the previous section are contrary to several state and 
federal court decisions.  Specifically, the court recognized all marks other than that of the 
religion itself as distinctive.  It also used the admissions of the parties and the view of the 
relevant public to determine if an organization was committing deception by using the name of a 
religion in its mark.  Although, the court did come to the same conclusion as the majority of 
courts with regard to consumer confusion; it recognized that if a religious mark is found to be 
distinctive, it will likely result in confusion.  This section will outline the parts of the test applied 
in the previous section which are contrary to that of some state and federal courts. 
 
Several courts have suggested that names used to describe denominations, like religions, 
are generic.
148
  However, general conclusions of this nature are inappropriate in a trademark 
infringement suit.  Each religious trademark case must be analyzed separately, applying the 
specific facts of the case to the context and structure of religious trademarks.  In determining 
whether the name used to designate a religion deserves trademark protection, turns on which 
came first.  In the hypothetical, the religion was identified by the term “Servyism” before the 
organization used the term.  In this case, the best a religious organization can do is to create de 
facto secondary meaning and accept that it will not be granted monopolistic power over the term.  
However, if the organization had used the term “Servyism” before the public began using it, then 
the mark would have become a dual-function mark.  In this case, an organization may be able to 
receive trademark rights for the term if it can show that the primary significance of the mark is to 
refer to the organization and not the religion itself. 
 
Once the court has determined whether the term used to describe the religion is worthy of 
protection, the court can then evaluate whether the terms used to describe branches are worthy of 
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protection.  These separate and distinct religious organizations should be run through the same 
test as every other mark.  The problem courts generally face in running these branch and limb 
marks through the test is to suggest that the marks represent a completely different religion.  This 
problem can be easily solved by determining if the general public views the religious 
organization as a new religion or a branch of a current religion.  If the general public views it as 
a new, unaffiliated religion, then a court should apply the test as outlined above.  If the general 
public views it as a branch affiliated with a current religion, then a court should apply the general 
genericness tests.  These tests begin by determining whether the mark is used to identify the 
good itself.  The first test generally applied is identifying the noun and recognizing that a noun 
cannot receive protection.  It is important to remember in the religious trademark context that the 
noun should always be the religion and not the name of a specific branch or limb of that religion.   
More specifically, the good is the religion, not the branch or limb.  Branches and limbs are 
competitors offering the same good—the religion.   
 
Once the good has been identified, the mark can be evaluated separately.   By eliminating 
concerns relating to the name of the religion, a court can evaluate the mark as a whole to 
determine whether it is distinctive.  If words, with an independent meaning, are included in the 
mark in addition to the term used to describe the religion, then a court should not find the mark 
to be generic.
149
  If the words included in the mark describe a significant feature associated with 
the specific branch or limb, then the mark should be declared descriptive.
150
  If the mark does not 
directly refer, but instead requires imagination to recognize the feature of the branch or limb 
being referenced, then the mark should be declared suggestive.  Additionally, a mark should be 
declared suggestive if it describes a religious tradition in general and not one specific to the 
organization.
151
  If the words have a meaning unrelated to the religion and the branch or limbs 
specific features, they should be declared arbitrary.
152
  Finally, if they are completely new words 
then the mark should be declared fanciful.
153
   
 
  This analysis was applied by the federal court in Part III in reaching its conclusions as to 
the distinctiveness of each mark.  By applying this test the court was able to protect those 
religious marks that truly deserved protection.  In doing so, the court protected the interests of 
the religious organizations, the parishioners of those religious organizations, and third parties 
considering joining the religious organizations.   
 
In addition to protecting these parties through the appropriate alterations to the 
distinctiveness analysis, the court also protected these parties by preventing a deception from 
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occurring on the general public.  Some courts have suggested that a court violates first 
amendment rights by determining if a religious organization is using the name of a religion in its 
mark for which it does not practice.
154
  Only one part of this argument is valid: a court should not 
create its own interpretation, without the support of evidence, of what a religion represents.  
Instead, a court should be allowed to use a defendant’s admissions in determining whether it 
follows the religious beliefs as described by the general public.  This requires the parties to 
provide survey evidence showing the relevant public’s interpretation of the religion.  The general 
practices applied by all branches of the religion can also be used as evidence to show the public 
understanding of what the religion represents.  By applying these standards and legal principles, 
a court can provide general protection to the identity associated with the generic term of a 
specific religion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Religious trademark suits must be evaluated in a three-stage process.  First, courts must 
fully understand the context of religious trademarks in general.  Second, courts must evaluate the 
specific facts of a case within the religious trademark context.  Finally, courts must apply the 
appropriate tests, as identified in this article, to the specific facts identified within the religious 
trademark context.  This three-stage process will protect the identity of an organization held most 
sacred to many in our populace. 
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